The World Bank And Human Rights: Indispensable Partnership Or Mismatched Alliance? by Moris, Halim
THE WORLD BANK AND HUMAN RIGHTS:
INDISPENSABLE PARTNERSHIP OR MISMATCHED
ALLIANCE?
Halim Moris*
I. INTRODUCTION ......................................................... 174
II. THE WORLD BANK: AN OVERVIEW ............................... 178
III. THE CASE AGAINST USING THE WORLD BANK TO
ENFORCE AND/OR MONITOR HUMAN RIGHTS .................... 182
A. Using the World Bank to Enforce and/or
Monitor Human Rights is an Illegal Act that
Violates International Law .................................... 182
1. Using the World Bank to Enforce
and/or Monitor Human Rights
Violates the Bank's Articles of
A greem ent ................................................ 182
2. Using the World Bank to Enforce
and/or Monitor Human Rights is a
Form of Coercion Prohibited by
United Nations' Charter ................................ 183
3. Using the World Bank to Enforce
and/or Monitor Human Rights
Violates the Principle of Sovereignty ................ 184
4. Using the World Bank to Enforce
and/or Monitor Human Rights
Violates the International Principles
of Equality ................................................ 185
5. Using the World Bank to Enforce
and/or Monitor Human Rights
* Halim Moris is a 1997 cu laude graduate of Suffolk University Law School, Boston
Massachusetts. He received his B.S. from the College of Communication at Boston University
where he graduated summa cur laude. Mr. Moris has been an active member of various human
rights organizations and international law societies. Currently, Mr. Moris is employed as a staff
attorney with the Immigration Unit at Greater Boston Legal Services where he represents asylum
seekers and immigrants. Mr. Moris wishes to thank both Professor Marguerite Dorn and
Professor Valerie Epps for all their help and outstanding support and encouragement.
ILSA Journal of Int'l & Comparative Law [Vol. 4:173
Violates the Developing Countries'
Right to Development ............. : .................... 186
B. Using the World Bank to Enforce and/or
Monitor Human Rights is Detrimental to
the Parties and the Process ................................... 188
C. Using the World Bank to Enforce and/or
Monitor Human Rights is Impractical ....................... 190
IV. THE CASE FOR THE WORLD BANK'S
MONITORING AND/OR ENFORCING HUMAN
RIGHTS ACROSS THE GLOBE ......................................... 192
A. Using the World Bank to Enforce and/or
Monitor Human Rights is Legal .............................. 192
B. Using the World Bank to Enforce and/or
Monitor Human Rights is Both Practical
and Benefi cial .................................................... 197
V. THE WORLD BANK'S ACTUAL PRACTICES IN THE
AREA OF HUMAN RIGHTS ............................................. 198
VI. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION ........................................ 199
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent escalation of human rights abuses around the world has
led many to question the effectiveness of the current methods used to
enforce and/or monitor human rights around the globe.' As a result, many
states, as well as non-government organizations, are slowly realizing that
the use of economic aid as a weapon against human rights abuses may be
1. As Patricia Striling accurately states:
In the past ten years, human rights tragedies have abounded. To
comprehend the seriousness of the situation and the urgent need for some
type of effective enforcement of core human rights, one need only consider
such tragedies as the tribal slaughters in Rwanda, the atrocities in the former
Yugoslavia and the thousands of demonstrators gunned down by government
forces in Burma. The alarming frequency of horrific violations of
fundamental human rights illustrates the overall ineffectiveness of current
methods of protection. An effective alternative is obviously needed, one
that is capable of garnering universal support and which has quick and
effective mechanisms for enforcement,
Patricia Stirling, The Use of Trade Sanctions As An Enforcement Mechanism for Basic Human
Rights: A Proposal for Addition to the World Trade Organization, 11 AM. U.J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 1, 45 (1996).
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the most effective enforcement mechanism to date. 2  And what financial
institution would be better suited to carry out that mission than the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank or
IBRD)., The suitability of the World Bank stems from various factors.
2. See, e.g., United States International Financial Institutions Act, 22 U.S.C. § 262d(f)
(1988) (instructing United States Executive Directors of the World Bank "to oppose any loan,
any extension of financial assistance, or any technical assistance to any country," whose
government is engaged in a pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights
unless the assistance "is directed specifically to programs which serve the basic human needs of
the citizens of such country"). The Act further provides, in part:
Section 701(a) [T]he United States Government, in connection with its voice and vote
in the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International
Development Association, the International Finance Corporation, the Inter-American
Development Bank, the African Development Fund, and the Asian Development Bank,
shall advance the cause of human rights, including by seeking to channel assistance
toward countries other than those whose governments engage in . . . 1) a) consistent
pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, such as torture
or cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged detention
without charges, or other flagrant denial to life, liberty, and the security of person. b)
Further, the Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct each Executive Director of the
above institutions to consider in carrying out his duties: 1) specific actions by either
the executive branch or the Congress as a whole on individual bilateral assistance
programs because of human rights considerations: 2) the extent to which the
economic assistance provided by the above institutions directly benefits the people in
the recipient country. . . (c) The Secretaries of State and Treasury shall report
annually to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate
on the progress toward achieving the goals of this title, including the listing required in
subsection (d). (d) The United States Government, in connection with its voice and
vote in the institutions listed in subsection (a), shall seek to channel assistance to
projects which address basic human needs of the people of the recipient country. The
annual report required under subsection (c) shall include a listing of categories of such
assistance granted, with particular attention to categories that address basic human
needs. (e) In determining whether a country is in gross violation of internationally
recognized human rights standards, as defined by the provisions of subsection (a), the
United States Government shall give consideration to the extent of cooperation of such
country in permitting an unimpeded investigation of alleged violations of
internationally recognized human rights by appropriate international organizations
including, but not limited to, the International Committee of the Red Cross, Amnesty
International, the International Commission of Jurists, and groups or persons acting
under the authority of the United Nations or the Organization of American States.
Id. § 701 (a).
In addition, see Staff Writer, India - Human Rights: Group Urges Action On Child Labor,
INTER PRESS SERVICE, Sept. 16, 1996, at 1 (the Human Rights Watch Urges the Suspension of
Economic Aid to India Due to Abused Children in the Indian Labor Market); see also Peter R.
Baehr, Concern for Development Aid and Fundamental Human Rights: The Dilemma as Faced
by the Netherlands, 4 HuM. RTs. Q. 39, 42 (1982) (outlining the Dutch government's use of
civil and political rights as a precondition for development aid).
3. See Ibrahim F. L. Shihata, The World Bank and Human Rights: An Analysis of Legal
Issues and the Record of Achievements, 17 DEN. J. INT'L. L. & POL'Y 39, 40 (1988)
(highlighting the World Bank's suitability to play an active role in the area of human rights).
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First, the World Bank is owned by the governments of 177 countries,4 and
any decision by the World Bank in the area of human rights will be seen as
a multi-lateral decision, and as such, will carry greater weight than a
unilateral decision by one specific nation state.' Second, unlike the
International Monetary Fund, 6 the World Bank does have the authority to
provide direct loans and financial assistance to nation states for the purpose
of development and that, in turn, means that the World Bank can exercise
greater power in the area of human rights than can the International
Monetary Fund.' Finally, in recent years, due to the widening gap
between poor and rich countries, in addition to the World Bank's ever-
increasing financial strength,8 the bank loans to developing countries are
now considered "the primary source" of foreign capital,9 making the
World Bank a potential champion of human rights.
4. WORLD BANK, 1996 ANN. REP. 3. The World Bank's assets, funds and properties are
owned by member countries in the form of shares and stocks. Countries who contribute more
money to the Bank will have more ownership rights in the World Bank. Id.
5. Some commentators argue that a multi-lateral decision to suspend aid to a country that
violates human rights is far more effective than a unilateral decision, and that there is an inherent
weakness in unilateral decisions to suspend aid since
an aid donor's formal statement that an aid recipient violated human rights, followed
by the subsequent withdrawal or suspension of aid, can insult the criticized government
publicly, and thereby damage bilateral relations. As a result, aid donors are unlikely
to raise human rights issues in such a manner, particularly with countries of political,
economic, or strategic importance.
Kaoru Okuizumi, Implementing the ODA Charter: Prospects for Linking Japanese Economic
Assistance and Human Rights, 27 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 367, 395 (1995).
6. The International Monetary Fund's primary purpose was "to maintain an orderly
system of receipts and payments between nations" by maintaining a stable exchange rate of
currency. The International Monetary Fund does not provide loans for the purpose of
development, as the World Bank does. See Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Crossing the Rubicon:
Synthesizing the Soft International Law of the I.M.F. and Human Rights, 11 B.U. INT'L L. J. 81,
87 (1993). For the difference between the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, see
Joseph Gold, The Relationship Between the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, 15
CREIGHTON L. REV. 499, 501-03 (1981).
7. This is based on the theory that a country who needs a loan, or economic aid, is likely
to seek the help of the World Bank first, since the World Bank offers direct loans. The
International Monetary Fund, on the other hand, will only assist that country by helping them to
repay their debt to creditors on a timely basis. See BARTRAM S. BROWN, THE UNITED STATES
AND THE POLMCIZATION OF THE WORLD BANK 3 (Kegan Paul International ed. 1992).
8. In 1996, the World Bank distributed loans to developing countries in excess of
$13,000,000,000,000. See WORLD BANK, 1996 ANN. REP. § 6.
9. Victoria E. Marmorstein, World Bank Power to Consider Human Rights Factors in
Loan Decisions, 13 J. INT'L L. & Eco. 113, 118 (1978). The reasons for the increasing reliance
of developing countries on the World Bank, for loans, is due to the fact that the World Bank
loans are not only given at a very low interest rate (which averages 5%), but there is also a
nominal service charge of only 0.75%, and there is a generous grace period before which any
payment is expected . . . typically 10 years. That makes developing countries more apt to
borrow from the World Bank than from an open market, which imposes more stringent terms for
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But despite the apparent suitability of the World Bank as a monitor
and/or enforcer of human rights across the globe, a growing number of
nation states and international scholars now strongly oppose the notion of
using the World Bank to monitor and/or enforce human rights.'0 These
opponents argue that using the World Bank for human rights purposes not
only contradicts the World Bank's own mandate and violates certain
principles of international law, but it is also highly impractical and
potentially detrimental to the World Bank and its members. This is due to
the fact that the World Bank would subsequently lose its prestigious
financial status, thereby becoming a mere political tool used to achieve
non-economic objectives."
The following note will explore the various arguments made as to
the legality or illegality of using the World Bank to defend human rights,
and it will also examine the World Bank's historical practices within the
context of human rights. The main purpose of this note, however, is not to
assess the strengths and/or weaknesses of the various arguments made.
Rather, it is to highlight those arguments in an effort to aid the reader in
forming his or her own view on the issue. As for my personal view on the
issue, it will be expressed at the end of this note. I have divided this note
into four general sections. First, an overview of the World Bank and its
operating mechanism. In the second section, I will explore the various
arguments asserted against using the World Bank to monitor and/or
enforce human rights around the world. Section three deals with the
various arguments asserted in favor of the World Bank playing such a role.
And in the fourth and final section, I will examine the World Bank's actual
practices in the area of human rights from the time of its inception.
borrowing. See CHERYL PAYER, THE WORLD BANK: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 23-26 (1982);
BROWN, supra note 7, at 5.
10. See Jonathan Cahn, Challenging The New Imperial Authority: The World Bank and the
Democratization of Development, 6 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 156 (1993); Robert E. Lutz,
Environment, Economic Development and Human Rights: A Triangular Relationship?, 82 AM.
SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 40, 61-2 (1988); David A. Writh, The United States and World Bank:
Constructive Reformer or Fly in the Functional Ointment?, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 687 (1994);
James B. Wolf, Africa, Human Rights and the Global System: The Political Economy of Human
Rights in a Changing World, 24 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 241-43 (1995); Jerome Levinson,
Conference on Human Rights, Public Finance, and Development Process. Multilateral
Financing Institutions: What Forms of Accountability?, 8 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 47
(1992).
11. See BROWN, supra note 7, at 53-86; Lutz, supra note 10, at 60-63.
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II. THE WORLD BANK: AN OVERVIEW
The World Bank was established in 1944 by the United Nations
Monetary and Financial Conference. 2 The original purpose of the World
Bank was to reconstruct war-tom Europe. But with the introduction of the
Marshall Plan in 1947, the World Bank was now free to shift its resources
to developing countries.'3 The World Bank is comprised of four different
agencies known as The World Bank Group.•4 The World Bank Articles of
Agreement states that one of the World Bank's official purposes is
12. See Brian B. A. McAllister, The United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development: An Opportunity to Forge a New. Unity in the Work of the World Bank Among
Human Rights, the Environment, and Sustainable Development, 16 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 689, 701 (1993).
13. BROWN, supra note 7, at 4.
14. The World Bank Group is comprised of the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development [hereinafter IBRD], the International Development Association [hereinafter IDA],
the International Finance Corporation [hereinafter IFC], and the Multilateral Investment
Guarantee Agency [hereinafter MIGA]; see Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, opened for signature Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1440, T.I.A.S.
No. 1502, 2 U.N.T.S. 134; Articles of Agreement of the International Development Association,
done Jan. 26, 1960, 11 U.S.T. 2284, T.I.A.S. No. 4607, 439 U.N.T.S. 249; Articles of
Agreement on the International Finance Corporation, done May 25, 1955, 7 U.S.T. 2197,
T.I.A.S. No. 3620, 264 U.N.T.S. 117. Each one of those agencies plays a role in carrying out
the World Bank's objective of encouraging development in the third world, and each of those
agencies was established on, or subsequent to 1945, when the World Bank's Articles of
Agreements were opened for signature. The first agency established was the IBRD, which is the
main branch of the World Bank. It was established in 1945, and its purpose was to provide
direct loans to countries in need.
The International Development Association (IDA) was created in 1960 due to the
perceived inability of the IBRD to respond to a growing group of underdeveloped countries in
need of a more liberal type of development fund. The IDA was designed to provide assistance
for the same purposes as the IBRD, but primarily to the poorer developing countries and on
terms that would bear less heavily on their balance of payments than would IBRD loans. IDA
assistance is, therefore, concentrated on the very poorest countries---those with an annual per
capita gross national product of $610 or less (in 1990 dollars). More than forty countries (mostly
in Africa) are eligible under this criterion. By contrast, IBRD loans are directed toward
developing countries at more advanced stages of economic and social growth. Whereas money
distributed by the IBRD is deemed a loan, funds paid out by the IDA are called credits.
• The other two institutions in the World Bank Group are the International Finance
Corporation and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency. The IFC was established in
1956 to assist the economic development of less-developed countries by promoting growth in the
private sector of their economies and helping to mobilize domestic and foreign capital for this
purpose. Membership in the IBRD is a prerequisite for membership in the IFC, which totals 146
countries. Legally and financially, the IFC and the IBRD are separate entities. The IFC has its
own operating and legal staff, but draws upon the World Bank for administrative and other
services.
The MIGA was established in 1988 with the following mandate: to encourage equity
investment and other direct investment flows to developing countries through the mitigation of
non-commercial investment barriers. To carry out this mandate, MIGA offers investors
guarantees against non-commercial risks; advises developing member governments on the design
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to assist in the reconstruction and development of
territories of members by facilitating the investment of
capital for productive purposes, including the restoration of
economies destroyed or disrupted by war, the reconversion
of productive facilities to peacetime needs and the
encouragement of the development of productive facilities
and resources in less developed countries. '3
The vice president and general counsel of the World Bank
explained that the official purpose of the World Bank
encompasses such varied subjects as the alleviation of
poverty, the fulfillment of basic human needs for nutrition,
safe drinking water, education, health and housing, the
concern for the settlement of people affected by large
development projects (including the tribal people), the role
of women in development, and preserving the
environment.' 6
The World Bank's capital is raised by selling shares of the World
Bank to nation states that are members of the Bank. 7 The World Bank's
decision to provide, or to not provide loans to a particular developing
country is the responsibility of the World Bank's Board of Executive
Directors. ' The Board of Executive Directors consists of twenty-two
directors, and five of those twenty-two directors are appointed by the five
member states having the largest number of shares of capital stock.,9 The
Board of Executive Directors uses a weighted majority voting system in
rendering its decision, where the weight of each executive's vote will be
determined by the number of shares owned by the particular nation state
and implementation of policies, programs and procedures related to foreign investments; and
sponsors a dialogue between the international business community and host governments on
investment issues. By June 30, 1992, the convention establishing MIGA had been signed by 115
countries, of which 85 had also become members. See LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS, THE WORLD BANK: GOVERNANCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 7 (1993).
15. Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
opened for signature, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1440, T.I.A.S. No. 1502, 2 U.N.T.S. 134, as
amended Dec. 16, 1965, 16 U.S.T. 1942, T.I.A.S. No. 5929.
16. Shihata, supra note 3, at 40.
17. IBRD Articles of Agreement, art. VI, 3, 11 U.S.T. at 2296-97, 439 U.N.T.S. at 270.
Currently, there are 177 member states in the World Bank. See generally WORLD BANK, 1996
ANN. REP.
18. IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 17, art. V, § 3.
19. Id. Currently, the five member states having the largest number of shares in the Bank
are the United States, Japan, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. WORLD BANK, 1996
ANN. REP.
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which he or she represents.20 Currently, the United States exercises more
than eighteen percent of the total voting power of the Board of Executive
Directors, "nearly three times the amount exercised by the next largest
share holder, Japan." 2'
The World Bank became a specialized agency of the United
Nations in 1947, this by virtue of an agreement between the World Bank
and the United Nations.Y Under this agreement, the World Bank is
required to take note of the obligations assumed by members of the United
Nations and to have "due regard for decisions of the Security Council
under Articles 41 and 42 of the United Nations Charter.",3
20. See supra note 17.
21. See Wirth, supra note 10, at 695. "This weighted voting formula has never been very
popular with the developing countries since, in effect, it institutionalizes within the World Bank
the inequality between the economically strong countries and the economically weak ones."
BROWN, supra note 7, at 6. It is worth noting that the United States of America had an
inconsistent track record with regard to its position on the issue of linking economic aid with
human rights violations. For example, in 1965 the United States opposed the granting of any aid
to the Republic of South Africa and the government of Portugal for their human rights abuses.
However, the United States has consistently voted in favor of granting economic aid to China,
despite China's well documented human rights abuses. See UNITED STATES NATIONAL
ADVISORY COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL MONETARY AND FINANCIAL POLICIES:
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, ANNUAL REPORTS TO THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS FOR FISCAL
YEARS WORLD BANK, 1980-1987; 1965, 1994, 1995, 1996 ANN. REP.
22. The Bank -is a specialized agency established by agreement among its member
governments and having wide international responsibilities, as defined in its Articles of
Agreement, in economic and related fields within the meaning of Article 57 of the Charter of the
United Nations. By reason of the nature of its international responsibilities and the terms of its
Articles of Agreement, the Bank is, and is required to function as, an independent organization,"
The Agreement Between the United Nations and the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, Nov. 15, 1947, art. 1(2), 16 U.N.T.S. 346 (hereinafter Agreement); see also
Agreement Between the United Nations and the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development on Relationship Between the United Nations and the International Finance
Corporation, 265 U.N.T.S. 314 and Agreement between the United Nations and the International
Development Association, 394 U.N.T.S. 222 for similar agreements related to IFC and IDA
respectively.
23. Agreement, supra note 22, art. VI (1). This Agreement further highlights the
reciprocal obligations between the World Bank and the United Nations. For example, article IV
of the agreement provides that:
1. The United Nations and the Bank shall consult together and exchange views on
matters of mutual interest. 2. Neither organization, nor any of their subsidiary
bodies, will present any formal recommendations to the other without reasonable
prior consultation with regard thereto. Any formal recommendations made by
either organization after such consultation will be considered as soon as possible
by the appropriate organ of the other. 3. The United Nations recognizes that the
action to be taken by the Bank on any loan is a matter to be determined by the
independent exercise of the Bank's own judgment in accordance with the Bank's
Articles of Agreement. The United Nations recognizes, therefore, that it would
be sound policy to refrain from making recommendations to conditions of
financing by the Bank with respect to particular loans or with respect to terms or
conditions of financing by the Bank. The Bank recognizes that the United
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In 1979, in response to an "acute balance of payments crisis in the
late 1970s among borrowing member countries," the World Bank officially
implemented what is known as "structural adjustment loans."' 4 These
structural adjustment loans are loans that are attached with policy-based
conditions aimed at forcing the borrowing countries to conform to certain
Bank policies and practices in their internal and/or external affairs. 2
Despite the question of the legality of the structural adjustment loans2 6 by
1992 the Bank's structural adjustment loans constituted twenty-seven
percent of the Bank's total loans. 27
Today, the impact of the World Bank extends far beyond financial
aid to developing countries. Not only has the World Bank "assumed the
role as true leader in policy making for smaller and newer international
and regional development banks(such as the African Development Bank,
the Asian Development Bank, and the Inter-American Development
Bank"), but also the Bank is "recognized as the intellectual leader and
influences policy changes ... .
Nations and its organs may appropriately make recommendations with respect to
the technical aspects of the reconstruction or development plans, programs or
projects.
Id.
24. Diana E. Moller, Intervention, Coercion, or Justifiable Need? Legal Analysis of
Structural Adjustment Lending in Costa Rica, 2 Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM. 483, 501 (1995).
However, some scholars have argued that the World Bank, since its inception, has always put
conditions on its loans, and that the structural adjustment loans have always been a part of the
Bank's policy. See PAUL A. MOSELY, AID AND POWER: THE WORLD BANK AND POLICY-
BASED LENDING 25-27 (1991).
25. STANLEY PLEASE, THE WORLD BANK: LENDING FOR STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT, IN
ADJUSTMENT CRISIS IN THE THIRD WORLD 83, 87 (Richard E. Feinberg & Valeriana Kallab,
eds., 1984). For a complete history of the World Bank's structural adjustment loans and their
impact, see GIOVANNI ANDREA CORNIA, ADJUSTMENT WITH A HUMAN FACE (Claredon Press
Oxford eds., 1987); AART VAN DE LAAR, THE WORLD BANK AND THE POOR (Martinus Nijhoff
eds., 1980).
26. See Levinson, supra note 10, at 49-50. A full discussion of the legality of the
structural adjustment loans of the World Bank will be handled infra section II and section III. If
the World Bank is to become an active player in the area of human rights, it would most likely
do so by using structural adjustment loans to enforce and/or monitor human rights, and thus, the
question of the legality of structural adjustment loans is, in essence, the same question as to the
legality of the World Bank's involvement in the area of human rights.
27. WORLD BANK, 1992 ANN. REP. at 19.
28. McAllister supra note 12, at 702. Most of the regional development banks have
articles of agreement similar in scope to the World Bank, and most of those regional banks
implement similar policy-based loans as does the World Bank. These regional development
banks face that same question as to the legality of the structural adjustment loans which they
extend to developing countries. See John Linarelli, The European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development and Post-Cold War Era, 16 U. PA. J. INT'L BUS. L. 373 (1995) (highlighting the
legal challenges faced by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, including
structural adjustment loans).
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III. THE CASE AGAINST USING THE WORLD BANK TO ENFORCE
AND/OR MONITOR HUMAN RIGHTS
According to those who voice discomfort and discontent over the
idea of tying World Bank loans to human rights, such action is not only
illegal (as it violates international law), but it is also both impractical and
potentially detrimental. Each of these arguments will be explored
separately.
A. Using the World Bank to Enforce and/or Monitor Human Rights
is an Illegal Act that Violates International Law
In the eyes of those opposed to the World Bank acting as enforcer
and/or monitor of human rights, such a role is illegal under international
law on various grounds. These grounds include the violation of the Bank's
own Articles of Agreement; the violation of international law prohibiting
coercion in any form including economic coercion, the violation of the
principles of sovereign integrity and sovereign equality; and finally, the
violation of the recipient states' right to development. Each of these
arguments will be examined separately.
1. Using the World Bank to Enforce and/or Monitor Human Rights
Violates the Bank's Articles of Agreement
When making loans to developing countries, the World Bank
actually violates its own Articles of Agreement in considering human rights
factors, according to the opposition. Under the Bank's Articles of
Agreement, the Bank's main purpose is "to promote the long-range
balanced growth of international trade and the maintenance of equilibrium
in balances of payments by encouraging international investment for the
development of the productive resources of members, thereby assisting in
raising productivity, the standard of living and conditions of labor in their
territories." 29 Further, Article IV of the Bank's Articles of Agreement
expressly prohibits the Bank from taking on such a role. It states that:
the Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political
affairs of any member; nor shall they be influenced in their
decisions by the political character of the member or
members concerned. Only economic considerations shall
be relevant to their decisions, and these considerations
29. The World Bank Articles of Agreement, art. I (iii).
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shall be weighed impartially in order to achieve the
purpose stated in Article 1.30
Article III of the Bank's Articles of Agreement states that: the Bank shall
make arrangements to ensure that the proceeds of any loan are used only
for the purposes for which the loan was-granted, with due attention to
considerations of economy and efficiency and without regard to political or
other non-economic influences or considerations .3
Because of these provisions in the Bank's Articles of Agreement,
opponents argue that, "the World Bank is clearly and unequivocally
prohibited from making or denying loans based upon a country's
performance in terms of its human rights record, no matter how atrocious
that record may be. "32 That is because the human rights issues are not only
beyond the Bank's stated purpose, but also because they are viewed as
political issues that the Bank is prohibited from considering in its loans
decisions .3
2. Using the World Bank to Enforce and/or Monitor Human Rights
is a Form of Coercion Prohibited by United Nations' Charter
Using economic aid to force recipient countries to comply with
and/or respect human rights is a form of coercion prohibited by
international law. Many developing nation states argue that the Bank's use
of economic aid in order to force compliance with human rights norms
clearly violates the United Nations Charter, as well as international law,
due to its coercive nature.34 These nation states cite Article II, paragraph 4
of the United Nations Charter, which states that "all members shall refrain
in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any manner
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations."' Here, they argue,
the Bank's use of economic aid over developing nations who are in
desperate need of such aid, amounts to an economic use of force and
30. Id. art. IV, § 10. Despite this express language that prohibits the Bank from
considering non-economic factors in its loan decisions, in the early 1980's the Bank
implemented what are known as Structured Adjustment Policies. These are ideology based loans
aimed at forcing developing countries to comply with certain ideologies. For a history of the
Structured Adjustment Policies, see Henry S. Bienen & Mark Gersovitz, Economic Stabilization,
Conditionality, and Political Stability, 39 INT'L ORG. 729 (1985).
31. Id. art. III, § 5b.
32. Levinson, supra note 10, at 56.
33. IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 17, art. III, § 5b
34. BROWN, supra note 7, at 53-59.
35. U.N. CHARTER, art. II, para 4.
1997]
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coercion that is prohibited by the United Nations Charter. 36 These nation
states further argue that a prohibition against coercion by means other than
armed attacks, such as economic force, was implicitly affirmed by the
International Court of Justice in its opinion in Nicaragua v. United States."
In that case, the court recognized that an illegal use of coercive force need
not take the extreme form of an armed attack, but could take "other less
grave forms."3  And that economic coercion, in the form of withholding
aid from developing countries who do not comply with the Bank's human
rights policy, falls within the scope of the less grave forms standard set by
the International Court of Justice in Nicaragua v. United States. Thus, the
Bank's use of economic force (in the form of withholding aid to developing
countries) does indeed constitute an illegal use of coercive force prohibited
by international law.
3. Using the World Bank to Enforce and/or Monitor Human Rights
Violates the Principle of Sovereignty
Imposing the World Bank's human rights ideology on recipient
nations constitutes an illegal violation of the principle of state sovereignty,
in addition to violating the United Nations' Charter. Many of the aid
recipient countries argue that the act of linking economic aid to the human
rights policies of the recipient countries infringes on the sovereignty of
those countries, while also constituting unlawful interference with their
domestic affairs.19 And that form of interference is forbidden by the
United Nations' Charter, which expressly prohibits any interference in the
domestic affairs of member states, while mandating respect for the
sovereign integrity of those states.'0 They further argue that a state's
economic policy is clearly within the state's sovereign power, and that
international law ( for the most part) acknowledges that each state has a
right to decide what economic policy it will follow in its domestic setting
and in its dealings with other states." Therefore, tying economic aid to a
human rights policy will only serve to hinder and infringe on the states'
ability to pursue a particular economic policy, both domestically and
internationally. In addition, within the context of various United Nations'
36. Stephen C. Neff, The Law of Economic Coercion: Lessons From the Past and
Indications of the Future, 20 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 3 (1981); BROWN, supra note 7, at 54.
37. Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 4 (June 27).
38. Id. at 101; BROWN, supra note 7, at 58.
39. See Susumu Awanohara et al., Vienna Showdown, FAR E. ECON. REV. (1993)
Michael Vatikiotis & Robert Delfs, Cultural Divide, FAR E. ECON. REV. 20 (1993), 16.
40. See U.N. CHARTER, art. 1, § 2; art. 2, § 1; art. 2, § 4; and art. 2, § 7.
41. BROWN, supra note 7, at 66.
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resolutions and declarations, developing countries have stressed the
importance of their sovereign integrity, as well as their condemnation of
any attempt to interfere with such sovereignty vis-a-vis economic means . 2
Thus, any attempt by the World Bank to impose its human rights agenda
on recipient countries through the use of economic aid not only violates the
sovereign integrity of those countries, but is also an act which is prohibited
by international law.
4. Using the World Bank to Enforce and/or Monitor Human Rights
Violates the International Principles of Equality
Using the World Bank to enforce and/or monitor human rights in
developing countries violates the legal principle of sovereign equality. The
United Nations' Charter explicitly states that one of the fundamental
principles of international law and United Nations membership is "the
principle of sovereign equality of all members."4 3  But since only
developing countries are in need of economic aid from the World Bank,
this will mean that only developing countries will be subject to human
42. See United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the Regional Meeting for Asia of the
World Conference on Human Rights, Final Declaration of the Region Meeting .for Asia of the
World Conference on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/PC/59 para. 4 (1993),
[hereinafter Bangkok Declaration] ("The Ministers and representatives of Asian States, meeting
at Bangkok from 29 March to 2 April 1993. .. discourage any attempt to use human rights as a
conditionality for extending development assistance."). In contrast, it should be noted that the
Vienna Declaration and Program of Action of the World Conference on Human Rights contained
no provisions concerning development aid conditioned on human rights. United Nations,
General Assembly, Vienna Declaration and Program of Action of the World Conference on
Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (1993); A.W. Clausen, former World Bank
President, acknowledged the sovereignty of developing nations when he stated that the World
Bank worked "in close partnership with its developing members -- which number well over a
hundred separate, sovereign, culturally diverse societies . . . ." WARREN C. BAUM & STOKES
M. TOLBERT, INVESTING IN DEVELOPMENT: LESSONS OF WORLD BANK EXPERIENCE v (1985).
Finally, the 1966 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of
States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty states that:
I. No state has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason
whatever, in the internal or external affairs of another state. Consequently, armed
intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats against the
personality of the State or against its political, economic and cultural element are
condemned.
2. No state may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of
measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the
exercise of its sovereign rights or to secure from it advantages of any kind.
6. All states shall respect the right of self-determination and independence of
peoples and nations, to be freely exercised without any foreign pressure ...
UNGA Resolution 2131 (XX) of 21 December 1965, U.N. GAOR, Vol. 20, Supp. 14 at, 11, U.N.
Doc. A/6014 (1966).
43. U.N. CHARTER, art. 2 (1).
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rights scrutiny of the World Bank," and that, in turn, violates the principle
of sovereign equality and equal treatment among nation states.
5. Using the World Bank to Enforce and/or Monitor Human Rights
Violates the Developing Countries' Right to Development
Finally, the World Bank's withholding of economic aid, due to
human rights abuses, is illegal since it violates the recipient nation's right
to economic development. Recipient states argue that they are entitled to
the right of development, which has "progressed from its status as an
international norm, recognized by repeated non-binding United Nations'
resolutions, to the status of an evolving general principle of international
law. 1 45  The recipient states further argue that the World Bank and the
44. Developing countries point out that human rights abuses are just as prevalent in
developed countries as in developing countries, and that using the World Bank to enforce human
rights will only mean that developing countries will be subject to the scrutiny of the Bank, while
developed countries will be free to abuse human rights as they wish, unmonitored. Some of the
examples given illustrating human rights abuses in developed countries are: In Australia,
Aborigines comprise about 1.8% of the total Australian population, approximately 300,000
individuals, who are not only under-represented in the political process, but also ill-treated. See
Theresa Simpson, Claims of Indigenous People to Cultural Property in Canada, Australia, and
New Zealand, 18 HASTINGS INT'L COMP. L. REV. 195, 204-205 (1994); Australian PM Pledges
Better Aborigine Treatment, Reuter Libr. Rep., Dec. 10, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, World File. For historical view of the Australian's treatment of Aborigines, see
RICHARD BROOME, ABORIGINAL AUSTRALIANS: BLACK RESPONSE TO WHITE DOMINANCE,
(1788), (George Allen & Unwin 1982).
In Japan, it has been said, "Japan is more or less a democracy for ethnic Japanese, but
is not so great for ethnic Koreans or other minorities." See Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P.
Miller, The End of History and the New World Order: The Triumph of Capitalism and
Competition Between Liberalism and Democracy, 25 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 277, 282 (1992).
There are an estimated 677,000 Koreans in Japan who are not only deprived of participating in
Japanese democracy, but are also discriminated against by native-born Japanese. See William H.
Lash III, Unwelcomed Imports: Racism, Sexism, and Foreign Investments, 13 MICH. J. INT'L L,
8 (1991). For a history of Japanese treatment of Koreans in Japan, see Changsoo Lee, Koreans
in Japan: Ethnic Conflict and Accommodation, Univ. of Calif., Berkeley Press (1981).
In the United States, despite their alleged autonomy, Native Americans are not only
discriminated against, but for the most part, severely under-represented in the American
democratic process and deprived of basic human rights. For a history and evaluation of the
status of Native Americans, see STUART LEVINE AND NANCY OESTREICH LURIE, THE
AMERICAN INDIAN TODAY, (Everett Edwards, Inc. Florida, 1968); DALE VAN EVERY,
DISINHERITED: THE LOST BIRTHRIGHT OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN (1966).
45. Moller, supra note 24, at 493. The World Bank senior counsel acknowledged that the
right to development is a "third generation" human right. See Aly Abu-Akeel, World Bank
Perspectives, 15 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 552-3 (1985). However, some scholars argue that third
generation human rights are considered soft rights and differ from the "traditional" human rights
included in the International Declaration of Human Rights because they include such rights as the
rights to development, environment, peace, and participation. See Rajagopal, supra note 6, at 84
n. 11, 96. The recipient countries cite a number of international instruments in support of their
assertion that they are entitled to the right of development. Among these instruments is Article I,
paragraph 3 of the U.N. Charter that states that the purpose of the United Nations is "to achieve
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donor nations not only have an obligation to extend economic aid for the
economic exploitation that took place during the colonization period,'4 but
also that any withholding of aid that is justified on grounds of human rights
is a violation of the recipient countries' right to develop."' Finally, the
recipient nations argue that tying economic aid with human rights is a
international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or
humanitarian character . . . ." U.N. CHARTER, art. I, para 3; The International Covenant of
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which articulates the right of development in various
articles such as the right to work and to work in "just and favorable" conditions, id. art. 7; the
right to social security, id. art. 9; the right to enjoy the highest attainable standard of physical
and mental health, id. art. 12; the right to an education, id. art. 13; and everyone's right to
enjoy cultural life and the benefits and applications of scientific progress id. art. 15. In
particular, article 11 recognizes the right "of everyone to an adequate standard of living for
himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and the continuous
improvement of living conditions and the fundamental right to be free from hunger." U.N.
CHARTER art. 11.
Under Article 4, State Parties "may subject such (economic, social, and cultural) rights only
to such limitations as are determined by law only in so far as this may be compatible with the
nature of these rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare of these
rights." See ICESCR, Dec. 16, 1986, art. 4, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. (1966); Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217 A (Ill), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71, arts. 17, 22-
26 (1948), (recognizing such rights as the right to own property, to work and receive just pay, to
receive social security, and to receive free education). Article 25 specifically states that
"everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself
and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social
services . Id.
In addition, the United Nations' Declaration on the Right to Development states in part that:
1) The human person is the central subject of development and should be the active
participant and beneficiary of the right to development.
2) All human beings have a responsibility for development, individually and
collectively, taking into account the need for full respect of their human rights and
fundamental freedoms as well as their duties to the community, which alone can ensure
the free and complete fulfillment of the human being, and they should therefore
promote and protect an appropriate political, social and economic order for
development.
3) States have the right and duty to formulate appropriate development policies that
aim at the constant improvement of the well-being of the entire population and of all
individuals, on the basis of their active, free and meaningful participation in
development and in the fair distribution of the benefits resulting therefrom.
See The United Nations' Declaration on the Right to Development, UNGA Res. 41/128, art. 2.
(1986).
46. For a full analysis of this argument, see Seymour J. Rubin, Most Favored Nation
Treatment and the Multilateral Trade Negotiations: A Quiet Revolution, 6 INT'L TRADE L.J.
221, 225 (1980-81) (presenting the developing nations' argument that special treatment is needed
for their weakened economies due to long periods of dependency and the effects of colonialism);
"Consessional aid from the rich, often demanded as a matter of right, is regarded by developing
nations as an inadequate recompense for past injuries." Rubin, infra note 54, at 87.
47. Id.
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conspiracy by the World Bank and the developed countries, aimed at
depriving recipient nations of the right to genuine development.4 8
B. Using the World Bank to Enforce and/or Monitor Human Rights
is Detrimental to the Parties and the Process
Recipients of the World Bank aid argue that tying the Bank's
economic aid to human rights is detrimental to all parties involved, namely
the recipient nations,49 the donor nations,-° and the World Bank itself.
As for the recipient countries, the argument is made that the World
Bank's withholding of economic aid, due to human rights abuses, is likely
to hurt the people rather than the governments," and that due to the
dependency those countries have on the World Bank loans, withholding of
those loans (for human rights reasons) will likely cause economic
stagnation in those countries. That, in turn, will cause an increase in
human rights abuses since there is a positive correlation between poverty
and human rights abuses. 2 That is the greater the level of poverty in a
particular country, the greater the possibility that human rights abuses will
be found in that country. In addition, recipient countries argue that
48. See THE BRANDT COMM'N (INDEPENDENT COMM'N ON INT'L DEVELOPMENT
ISSUES), NORTH-SOUTH: A PROGRAM FOR SURVIVAL (1980) (assessing the thesis that the ills of
the developing nations stem from their exploitation by developed nations). Under this view, if
the terms of a structural adjustment loan cause significant economic suffering, deprive an
individual of adequate food, clothing, housing, employment, or subject the individual to
inadequate living conditions, the terms of the loan are in violation of the individual's right to
development. Moller, supra note 24, at 497. The developing nations seek to end their
dependency on the developed world through fundamental structural changes in international
institutions and political power structures. See Mark Ewill Ellis, The New Industrial Economic
Order and General Assembly Resolutions: The Debate over the Legal Effects of General
Assembly Resolutions Revisited, 15 CAL. W. INT'L J. 647, 648 (1985) (discussing the South's
attempts to structurally change international organizations); R. Rothstein, Global Bargaining:
Unctad and the Quest for a New INT'L ECON. ORDER, 15, 240-80 (1979) (defining this dispute
in the context of the positions of the developing countries and the developed countries).
49. By recipient nations we mean those nations that receive loans and economic assistance
from the World Bank.
50. By donor nations we mean those nations that donate money to the World Bank in
exchange for shares.
51. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REP. XVI, XVIII (1994). Perhaps the most
vivid example of this is the economic blockade against Iraq which was proven to be detrimental
to the Iraqi people. It has been estimated that about one million Iraqi children have died since
1990 when an economic blockade was put on Iraq after the Gulf war. See Carol Hartman,
Sanctions Don't Hurt Saddam in Iraq: Nearly One Million Children Have Died Because of
Sanctions since 1990, Says a UW-Madison Professor, WISC. ST. J., 1997, at IC; Dilip Hiro,
Iraq: Oil income, Too Little, Too Late?, INTER PRESS SERVICE (1997), at 1.
52. See THE BRANDT COMM'N (INDEPENDENT COMM'N ON INT'L DEVELOPMENT
ISSUES), COMMON CRISIS: NORTH-SOUTH COOPERATION FOR WORLD RECOVERY 260-83
(1983) (highlighting the positive correlation between poverty and human rights abuses).
Moris
economic development is necessary before human rights can be fully
developed and protected,53 and that "civil and political rights are robbed of
significance unless there preexist social and economic human rights ....
[A] necessitous man is not a free man."4 Thus, the recipient nations
argue, withholding development aid will only hurt people and slow down
the journey of economic recovery which is destined to lead to full
enjoyment of human rights.
As for the donor countries, the argument is made that withholding
economic aid from developing countries, due to violations of human rights,
will be detrimental to donor countries as well. The argument goes as
follows: Economic aid to developing countries (who are known for having
large, untapped markets and an abundance of natural resources) serves to
stimulate the economies of those developing countries, and that, in turn,
enables developed countries (who are donor countries), to infiltrate the
markets in developing countries. Withholding any aid will have the
opposite effect, and the donor countries will lose potentially large markets,
and that, in turn, will affect the economy of the donor countries and cause
its stagnation." Furthermore, due to the fact that there is a limited number
of large donor countries with significant voting power in the World Bank,
developing countries will likely view any decision to suspend aid as a
decision articulated by those countries, and thus, they will likely refuse to
deliver natural resources to donor countries, which in turn, could hurt the
economies of the donor countries."
Advocates of this argument point to a recent example to support
their stand. They state that despite the atrocious human rights' abuses in
China and the well-publicized massacre in*Tianenmen Square, the World
Bank and the United States have nevertheless positioned China as the
highest aid recipient country, due to the potential economic benefits to be
had once the large Chinese market is infiltrated.57 As for the World Bank
itself, arguments have been made that there will be disastrous effects on
the World Bank if it tries to tie human rights with development loans. Put
simply, allowing the World Bank to examine other non-economic factors
(like human rights) in its loan decisions will transform the Bank from a
53. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REP. XVI, XIII (1994) (examining and responding
to the argument that economic development is a prerequisite to a full human rights protection).
54. Seymour J. Rubin, Economic and Social Human Rights and the New International
Economic Order, 1 AM U.J. INT'L L & POL'Y 67, 82 (1986).
55. For an overview of this argument, see Okuizumi, supra note 5, at 391-95.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 393. Despite the obvious human rights abuses in China, it still enjoys the status
of the most favorite trade partner with the United States See Mike Jendrzejczyk, Human Rights
and Most Favorite Nation for China, 1996 WL 10165077; China also is the 1996 highest
recipient of World Bank aid. See WORLD BANK, 1996 ANN. REP., § V.
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respected international financial institution to a political institution that is
likely to be used as a political weapon for purposes of political gains.m
"We cannot ignore the fact that the World Bank is a development financing
institution, and it should not become a tool for political games among its
members; that would be to the detriment of all its members." 9 And there
is a limit to institutional elasticity, i.e. the extent to which institutions are
created and still used for other purposes in order to get them to perform
human rights functions, especially when these functions are accomplished
at the expense of their manifest functions. Institutions simply cannot do
everything we think they are capable of, if this requires them to move too
far from their manifest mandate. ,0
C. Using the World Bank to Enforce and/or Monitor Human Rights
is Impractical
Opponents of the idea of the World Bank's involvement in human
rights argue that such an idea is impractical on several grounds. First,
they point to the irony of having an institution like the World Bank, which
itself is being accused of violating human rights, suddenly become a human
rights enforcer and/or monitor. And, in that the World Bank has a
"history" of funding projects that involve human rights abuses, "the
likelihood is high that human rights abuses will continue to occur in at least
some World Bank projects. "61 An example of this is the World Bank's
financing of the Kedung Ombo Dam project in Indonesia, which led to
extreme human rights abuses in the form of forced resettlement by the
Indonesian government, 2 and the financing of family planning programs in
58. Lutz, supra note 10, at 61-63.
59. Id. The argument further continues that there cannot be a stretch of World Bank
objectives to include non-economic factors such as human rights, since that will undermine the
Bank's effectiveness as an international economic institution, and that there is a limit as to the
"institutional elasticity" of the Bank, and that limit operates to maintain the Bank's credibility in
the world's financial affairs. Id.
60. Thomas Hutchins, Using the International Court of Justice to Check Human Rights
Abuses in the World Bank Projects, 23 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 487, 496 (1992).
61. Id. at 489-97.
62. Michael Reisman, Through or Despite Governments: Differentiated Responsibilities in
Human Rights Programs, 72 IOWA L. REV. 391, 395 (1987). In 1985 the World Bank approved
a loan for $156 million to the Republic of Indonesia for the construction of the Kedung Ombo
multipurpose dam. The total project cost $283 million. The Kedung Ombo dam, officially
completed on January 14, 1989, produces 22.5 megawatts of electricity a year, stores sufficient
water to irrigate between 57,000 and 62,000 hectors during the dry season, and prevents floods
during the rainy season. The dam project required the resettlement of 5,390 families in 37
villages, or about 25,000 people. The dam inundated 4,363 hectors of privately-owned land,
1,500 hectors of national forest and 304 hectors of land the Indonesian government owned, for a
total of 6,167 hectors. On January 14, 1989 the Indonesian government declared the Kedung
Ombo dam officially completed and closed its gates, yet a large number of people remained in
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developing countries, which led to human rights abuses in the form of
coercing young families not to have children.63
the area to be submerged by rising waters in the months to come. Estimates of the people
remaining ranged from almost 9,000 to more than 12,000. The people who refused to evacuate
did so chiefly because they felt that the Indonesian government had failed to compensate them
properly for their land. They felt that the government either had set too low a price, had not
negotiated properly, or had refused to allocate land to them which was comparable in size and
quality and close in proximity to the land they lost.
The Indonesian government engaged in a program of intimidation to force those who
remained in the area to leave. Some intimidation took the form of physical abuse of those who
refused to accept the government's compensation. One reputed victim of such abuse reported his
story to the Indonesian weekly magazine Tempo as follows:
[The old man, a grandfather] received an order to report to the local military
headquarters. He was filled with fear. And with good reason: the five soldiers who
interrogated him roughed him up. "My head was jerked back," the father of seven
children said. Next, a soldier slapped him in the face. This little drama.. .he said,
took place in front of and was witnessed by the government district head .... After
he was slapped . . . [his] courage failed. He immediately put his thumb print on a
release form and signed over his house and surrounding lot of 2,700 square meters for
monetary compensation of 1.5 million rupees . . . Some intimidation took the form of
death threats and threats of extended prison sentences: Local government officials
frightened villagers who refused to accept compensation by telling them they would be
killed under a government program for eliminating hardened criminals, or put in jail
for 13 years. Coupled with the death threats, units of the Indonesian security agency
BAKORI would go in the middle of the night to the homes of those who refused to
sign over their land, awaken them by pounding on their doors, order them outside to
answer questions, and then force them to sign compensation agreements. For a full
account of what happened in the Kedung Ombo Dam project.
Id.
Between the years of 1980 to 1986, the World Bank has financed an estimated 144 projects
around the globe that caused various forms of forced settlement of the locals. See CHARLES
ESCUDERO, INVOLUNTARY RESETTLEMENT IN THE WORLD BANK ASSISTED PROJECT 18-21
(1988).
The World Bank has admitted that it made mistakes in regards to its resettlement policies
and the human rights abuses associated with it. See Shahid Husain, Vice President of Operations
Policy for the World Bank, Operations Policy Note 10.08, Operations Policy Issues in the
Treatment of Involuntary Resettlement in Bank-Financed Projects (Oct. 10, 1986) [hereinafter
Policy Note 10.08]. "The Bank has sometimes not applied the policy and its related operational
procedures with adequate rigor, and issues have remained regarding the resettlement policies,
laws and practices of borrowers." Id. para. 3. "Supervision by the Bank of the implementation
of resettlement operations must be made more effective." Id. para. 6. Policy Note 10.08
stresses that the Bank has the duty not to make those mistakes: "it is essential that the Bank's
own approach set an example of how these (resettlement) issues should be addressed and that
Bank policies be applied to Bank-financed operations faithfully and effectively." Id. para. 3. "It
is not acceptable to leave unexplored or unimplemented reasonable measures to prevent those
dislocated from becoming temporarily or permanently impoverished." Id. para. 5. "It is
essential that the Bank's supervision of resettlement work be both diligent and effective." Id.
para. 9.
63. In Indonesia, for example, the World Bank "has supported five consecutive population
projects, totaling 211.8 million U.S. dollars," and these projects were characterized as including
.coercive practices" for population control. For a full account of those projects and their impact
on human rights, see In the Name of Development, supra note 62, at 105-34.
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Second, it is impractical to use the World Bank to enforce and/or
monitor human rights since neither the Bank nor its staff have the
necessary experience to perform such a complex role." The World Bank is
staffed mainly by economists. "They are there to play with numbers; they
are not there to make policy . . . . [I]t is a forlorn hope to expect that
economists will become sensitive to human rights issues."65 The World
Bank is not well-equipped, nor does it possess the expertise to play the role
of human rights advocate."6
Finally, it is impractical to use the World Bank to enforce and/or
monitor human rights abuses since the Bank lacks an effective monitoring
and enforcement mechanism.'" Once the Bank has given a loan to a
developing country, there is an "absence of a meaningful monitoring
system." 1 The World Bank's own 1992 report concluded that "little is
done to monitor the ultimate impact of Bank projects on recipient
countries."6 9 For all of the above-mentioned reasons, opponents of the
World Bank's involvement in human rights argue that the World Bank
should disentangle itself from human rights issues.
IV. THE CASE FOR THE WORLD BANK'S MONITORING AND/OR
ENFORCING HUMAN RIGHTS ACROSS THE GLOBE
Proponents of the idea that the World Bank should play an active
role in human rights point out that such a role is legal, beneficial and
practical.
A. Using the World Bank to Enforce and/or Monitor Human Rights
is Legal
Proponents argue that using the World Bank to enforce and/or
monitor human rights is legal for various reasons. To begin with, although
Article IV of the World Bank's Articles of Agreement prohibits the Bank
from considering political factors in its loan decisions,", "an analysis of the
Bank's articles reveals that it is empowered to incorporate human rights
64. Lutz, supra note 10, at 52.
65. Id.
66. Escor-r REID, STRENGTHENING THE WORLD BANK, 169 (Adlai Stevenson Institute,
Chicago 1973).
67. Cahn, supra note 10, at 183.
68. Id.
69. Id. (citing World Bank, Portfolio Management Task Force, Effective Implementation:
Key to Development Impact (July 24, 1992) (Discussion Draft)). This report clearly highlights
the Bank's failure to implement effective monitoring mechanisms once the loans were given. See
id. at IV.
70. IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 17, art. IV, § 10.
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factors into lending policies[.] Indeed, human rights fall beyond the
purview of article IV's political activity provision."" That is because
human rights not only political activities,7 but also some human rights have
been recognized as jus cogens by various international players, including
the International Court of Justice,' 3 international scholars'7 4 and the United
Nations .7  That, in turn, means that the World Bank "cannot hide behind
Article IV of its Articles of Agreement, and avoid human rights issues in
its loan decisions. In addition, as a specialized agency of the United
Nations and the Bank, the World Bank is obligated to cooperate with the
United Nations in the area of human rights .76 The relationship agreement
between the World Bank and the United Nations sets forth certain
mechanisms to achieve cooperation between the Bank and the United
Nations to implement the United Nations' objectives, including respect for
71. Marmorstein, supra note 9, at 124.
72. "When we are talking about a much more constructive approach to human rights, we
have to come back and argue quite clearly that human rights are not political, that they are
matters of international law." Lutz, supra note 10, at 54.
73. In Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., Ltd., the I.C.J. referred to the
fundamental nature of human rights by stating that,
[i]n view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal
interest in their protection: they are obligations erga omnes. Such obligations derive,
for example, in CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW, from the outlawing of acts of
aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles and rules concerning the basic
rights of the human person, including protection from slavery and racial
discrimination. Some of the corresponding rights of protection have entered into the
body of general international law . . . others are conferred by international instruments
of a universal or quasi-universal character.
Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Company, Ltd, 1970 I.C.J. 4, 33. (Feb. 5)
74. See Bilder, The Status of International Human Rights Law: An Overview, INT'L HUM.
RTS. L. & PRAC. 1, 3 (1978).
75. The preamble of the U.N. Charter states that "we the peoples of the United Nations
(are) determined . . .to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights . . . ." U.N. CHARTER
preamble. Article 55 of the Charter also states that "the United Nations shall promote: ...
universal respect for, and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." Id. In addition, the United Nations has
drafted a large number of declarations and resolutions that stressed the fundamental nature of
human rights, among these the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the 1952
Convention on the Political Rights of Women, the 1959 Declaration on the Rights of the Child,
the 1963 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the 1966
International Covenants on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and on Civil and Political
Rights, the 1971 Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons, the 1975 Declaration
on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and the 1981 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms
of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief. UNIFO, INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS: 1948-1982 (1983). See MARK W.
JANIS, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 248-49 (1993).
76. Marmorstein, supra note 9, at 130-33.
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human rights. 7 The World Bank's refusal to consider human rights factors
in its loan decisions will mean that the Bank not only breached its
agreement with the United Nations, but also violated international law.
Also, the United Nations' Charter explicitly states that "in the event of a
conflict between the obligation of the members of the United Nations under
the present charter, and its obligation under any other international
agreement, its obligation under the present charter shall prevail." 7  That,
in turn, means that the World Bank's donor states are obligated by the
United Nations' Charter to disregard any obligation under the Bank's
Articles of Agreement, which conflict with the objectives and goals of the
United Nations, and since one of the most important goals of the United
Nations is to promote the respect for human rights and to stop human
rights abuses around the globe, the donor states of the World Bank are
obligated to consider human rights factors in any loans made by the Bank
to developing countries.79 This is due, in part, to the fact that World
Bank's donor states, as well as all other state members of the World Bank,
act as states, not as representatives, of the World Bank.80
In addition, proponents argue, the World Bank's considerations of
human rights factors in its loan decisions does not amount to interference
with the sovereign integrity of the borrowing states. That is because the
77. Id. at 132. The U.N. IBRD Relationship Agreement, provides the mechanism for
cooperation on the human rights front. For example, Article II of the Agreement provides:
1) Representatives of the United Nations shall be entitled to attend, and to
participate without vote in, meetings of the Board of Governors of the Bank.
Representatives of the United Nations shall be invited to participate without
vote in meetings especially called by the Bank for the particular purpose of
considering the United Nations point of view in matters of concern to the
United Nations.
2) Representatives of the Bank shall be entitled to attend meetings of the
General Assembly of the United Nations for purposes of consultation.
3) Representatives of the Bank shall be entitled to attend, and to
participate without vote in, meetings of the committees of the General
Assembly, meetings of the Economic and Social Council, of the
Trusteeship Council and of their respective subsidiary bodies, dealing
with matters in which the Bank has an interest.
IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 17, art. II.
Article V states: [t]he United Nations and the Bank will, to the fullest extent practicable
and subject to paragraph 3 of article 1, arrange for the current exchange of information and
publications of mutual interest, and the furnishing of special reports and studies upon request. Id.
78. U.N. CHARTER art. 48 (2).
79. Escott, supra note 66, at 166.
80. See IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 17, art. I.
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principle of obligations erga omnes allows even states which are not
directly affected by human rights abuses to respond to those abuses. The
principle of erga omnes provides that a state which violates peremptory
human rights norms is accountable to all other states, and thus cannot
claim that its human rights policies are within its exclusive domestic
jurisdiction.' This is because human rights abuses directly injure not only
individual victims of the abuse, but also all of the states in the international
community, and those states have the right and the obligation to stop such
abuse.82
Also, the World Bank's utilization of human rights factors in its
loan decisions does not amount to economic coercion, as recipient states
may argue. A coercive act is defined as an illegal use of force, but here,
"the suspension or withdrawal of aid is not an illegal act."83 It is an act
that aims to pressure human rights violators to comply with international
law that mandates compliance with respect to human rights.' The
International Court of Justice explicitly affirmed that the suspension of
economic aid is not an illegal act that breaches international law."5
Furthermore, some scholars warn that interpreting the use of economic aid
as coercion, or as an illegal use of force will have detrimental
ramifications, since those who are subject to the suspension, or
withholding of that aid might then claim the right to initiate the use of
force in self-defense. 6 This would only serve to lower the threshold of
violence in international relations.
Furthermore, the World Bank's consideration of human rights
factors in loan decisions does not violate the recipient countries' rights to
development, as those states may argue. The right to development, like
the right to self-determination, is a right given to human beings, not to
states. 87 And while recipient states could argue that state development will,
81. Okuizumi, supra note 5, at 375.
82. Id. The same idea was articulated by the International Court of Justice in its opinion
in the Barcelona Traction case, where the court held that human rights abuses concern all states,
and once the international community acts to stop such abuse, the abusing state cannot object to
such an act under any legal grounds embodied in international law. See Barcelona Traction,
Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Beig. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 33 (Feb. 5).
83. Okuizumi, supra note 5, at 375.
84. Id.
85. The Court was "unable to regard such action on the economic plane as is here
complained of (cessation of economic aid) as a breach of the customary law." Military and
Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 4, 126 (June 27).
86. BROWN, supra note 7, at 58.9. Article 51 of the United Nations' Charter recognizes
the right to use force in self-defense. See U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
87. The right to development has been interpreted as being a right of people, not of states,
and such right embodies the following beliefs: 1) The realization of the potentialities of the
human person in harmony with the community should be seen as the central purpose of
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in turn, result in the satisfaction of the individual's right to development
(since economic prosperity will trickle down to individuals), such an
argument will not stand since "countries have, in fact, achieved reasonably
satisfactory growth rates without simultaneously attaining reasonably
satisfactory standards of living for the majority of the population."" Even
if the notion of a state's right to development was accepted, still, "human
rights should never be sacrificed to development. Rather, development
should serve to promote and protect rights - economic, social, cultural,
civil, and political. Respect for human rights will facilitate development
by bringing about a society in which individuals can freely develop their
own abilities. "" A real and sustained economic development is not
possible without respect to human rights.1°
Finally, proponents argue that the World Bank, by virtue of its
own nature, has the legal power to consider human rights factors in its
lending decisions. Not only does the World Bank's own Articles of
Agreement allow the Bank to consider non-economic factors in its lending
decisions, such as human rights factors, when "special circumstances"
arise, such as, arguably, gross violations of human rights, 9 but also the
World Bank, like any domestic bank, must consider various non-economic
factors in determining the credit-worthiness of a country, factors such as
"country risk" and "country stability," thereby, "a poor human rights
situation which threatens the internal stability could be a significant factor
in country risk analysis."9 The greater a country's instability because of
development; 2) The human person should be regarded as the subject and not the object of the
development process; 3) Development requires the satisfaction of both material and non-material
basic needs; 4) Respect for human rights is fundamental to the development process; 5) The
human person must be able to participate fully in shaping his own reality; 6) Respect for the
principles of equality and non-discrimination is essential; and 7) The achievement of a degree of
individual and collective self-reliance must be an integral part of the process. Report of the
Secretary General on the Right to Development, U.N. Comm. on Hum. Rts., 35th Sess., at 7-13,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.411334 (1979).
88. Seymour J. Rubin, Economic and Social Human Rights and the New International
Economic Order, AM. U.J. INT'L. & POL'Y 67, 92 (1986). United Nations study warned of the
danger of focusing on economic growth in development: Human rights may be submerged and
human beings seen only as instruments of production rather than as free entities for whose
welfare and cultural advance the increased production is intended. See U.N. Doc.
E/3347/Rev.1, para. 90 (1960). Perhaps one of the classic examples of this theory is the case of
Thailand. Despite the substantial increase in economic growth in Thailand, still Thailand
continues to have massive poverty and the distribution of wealth is highly unequal. See Goodno
B. James, Thailand's Malaise: Poverty, THE CANADIAN DIMENSION May-June 1994, at 40.
89. Okuizumi, supra note 5, at 384-85.
90. Stirling, supra note 1, at 12.
91. Levinson, supra note 10, at 49-50. The World Bank's own Articles of Agreement
provide that the Bank could consider non-economic factors in its loan decisions when there are
special circumstances warranting such action. See World Bank Articles of Agreement, art. 5.
92. Marmorstein, supra note 9, at 127-28.
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human rights abuses, the greater the risk the Bank will have to take in
deciding to extend loans to that country. Thus, the World Bank has the
implied power to consider human rights factors in its lending decisions, as
does any domestic bank when it considers the risk factors of a particular
borrower.
B. Using the World Bank to Enforce and/or Monitor Human Rights
is Both Practical and Beneficial
Proponents argue that considerations of human rights factors by the
World Bank, in its lending decisions, is beneficial since such
considerations will "enable the Bank to ensure that its resources do not
assist governments to circumvent human rights-motivated economic
sanctions, or contribute themselves to human rights deprivations." 9 In
addition, such considerations will have the profound, tangible benefits of
"alleviating present suffering, and paving the way for future improvement"
in the area of human rights.2 Furthermore, proponents argue that such
considerations will be beneficial for the World Bank itself in that they will
change the static nature of the Bank and inspire the Bank to consider and
participate in the relevant issues of the time, such as human rights.1 "The
Bank will need to make adjustments and accommodations to changed
circumstances in order to remain relevant to the problems and needs of its
members. "9
In addition, proponents argue that it is practical to use the World
Bank to monitor and/or enforce human rights. This is due not only to the
fact that the World Bank has tremendous influence on developing countries
(as a result of its lending ability), but also because "there is a growing
realization that the solutions to global-economic problems are inextricably
linked with the remedies to many human rights violations, "7 and that the
multilateral, and the universal nature of the World Bank will go a long way
toward complying with various United Nations resolutions which mandate
that human rights issues "be examined globally." 9
93. Id. at 135.
94. Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Human Rights, Development and International Financial
Institutions, 8 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 27, 37 (1992).
95. BROWN, supra note 7, at 246.
96. Id.
97. Rajagopal, supra note 6, at 83.
98. See Alternative Approaches and Ways and Means Within the United Nations System
for Improving the Effective Enjoyment of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, G.A. Res.
130, 32 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 45 at 150-518 U.N. Doc. A/32/45 (1977); Commission on
Human Rights, Res. 7/36, 65 U.N. ESCOR Supp. No. 3 at 164-66, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1408
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V. THE WORLD BANK'S ACTUAL PRACTICES IN THE AREA OF
HUMAN RIGHTS
Examining the history of the World Bank's actions in the area of
human rights reveals an inconsistent pattern of practice. In mid 1960, the
United Nations General Assembly issued two resolutions requesting that
the World Bank deny economic loans to the government of South Africa,
in light of its apartheid policy, and to the government of Portugal, due to
the human rights abuses which were occurring in the Portuguese colonies."
However, the World Bank refused to comply with the two resolutions,
claiming that it was "precluded from considering human rights factors in
loan decisions." 10 In 1972, the World Bank cut off loans to the Allende
government in Chili, citing among other reasons, violations of human
rights by the Allende government.10' Despite the objection/abstention of
the United States 6f America, the World Bank continues to approve loans
(1980) (stressing the importance of viewing human rights abuses as a global problem that
mandates a global solution).
99. In December 1965, the General Assembly adopted a resolution entitled "The Policies
of Apartheid Government of the Republic of South Africa." In this resolution the U.N.
requested "the specialized agencies of the U.N. take necessary steps to deny technical and
economic assistance to the Government of South Africa." The Policies of Apartheid of the
Government of the Republic of South Africa, G.A. Res. 2054 A (XX), 20 U.N. GAOR, Supp.
No. 14 at 16, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1966).
The General Assembly adopted a second resolution entitled, "Implementation of the
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries Peoples." Similarly, this
resolution requested the specialized agencies of the U.N. to withhold assistance to Portugal as a
result of its colonization policy. See The Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the
Republic of South Africa, G.A. Res. 2105 (XX), 20 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 14) at 16, U.N.
Doc. A/6014 (1966). For an in-depth discussion, see text accompanying notes 40-48, supra.
100. Marmorstein, supra note 9, at 114. The Bank justified its refusal on the grounds that,
[T]he Bank's Articles provide that the Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the
political affairs of any member and that they shall not be influenced in their decisions
by the political character of the member or members concerned. Only economic
considerations are to be relevant to their decisions. Therefore, I propose to continue to
treat requests for loans from these countries in the same manner as applications from
other members...I am aware that the situation in Africa could affect the economic
development, foreign trade and finances of Portugal and South Africa. It will
therefore be necessary in reviewing the economic condition and prospects of these
countries to take account of the situation as it develops.
Statement of IBRD President Woods to Executive Directors on March 29, 1966, in statement of
IBRD General Counsel to U.N. Fourth Committee, 21 U.N. GAOR, C.4 1645th mtg. 317-18
(1966), reprinted in 13 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 728 (1968).
101. See Reports of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the
International Development Association, and the International Finance Corporation, 1972
U.N.Y.B. 315-317.
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to countries which are well-known to have committed gross violations of
human rights. 1w
Yet the World Bank is also funding world-wide projects that have a
direct impact on human rights across the globe.103 These projects range
from giving Pakistan and Somalia loans in order to create work
opportunities for refugees' °0 to providing loans in order to promote the
equal treatment of women in third-world countries. 05
VI. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
With the increasing realization of the importance of economic
factors in international relations, human rights advocates are now focusing
on the notion that economics may be the most effective enforcement
mechanism for human rights to date. In the eyes of many, using the World
Bank is, potentially, the ultimate weapon against the persistent violations of
human rights around the globe. But the probability of the World Bank
becoming an effective enforcer of human rights is plagued by various legal
and non-legal obstacles, as noted above. An effective utilization of the
World Bank's power to monitor and/or enforce human rights will depend,
for the most part, on the Bank's ability to overcome these obstacles. Yet,
there are concrete steps which the Bank could take in an effort to overcome
these obstacles while becoming an active player in the arena of global
human rights.
First, the Bank could amend its Articles of Agreement to clearly
provide for the legal authority which the Bank needs in order to consider
human rights factors in its lending decisions. Second, the Bank could
create a sub-agency with sufficient human rights experience. This sub-
agency would be given the task of evaluating human rights conditions in
borrowing countries. In addition, this task force could be given the
responsibility of examining the potential impact that withholding and/or
withdrawing loans (for human rights violations) would have on the people
residing in those borrowing countries. Third, the Bank should adopt a
consistent policy of lending that would allow withholding and/or
withdrawing loans for human rights violations, regardless of who the
borrowing country is and what economic impact that withholding and/or
withdrawing would have on the international economic order or
international market. Finally, the Bank should abstain from funding
102. See generally United States National Advisory Council on International Monetary and
Financial Policies: International Finance, Annual Reports to the President and Congress for
Fiscal Years 1980-1987; WORLD BANK, 1996 ANN. REP.
103. For a list of these projects, see Shihata, supra note 3, at 48-66.
104. Id. at 60.
105. id. at 57-59.
1997] 199
200 ILSA Journal of Int'l & Comparative Law
projects that have the potential for human rights violations in any form,
including forced resettlement or coerced family planning.
By considering some or all of the above-mentioned suggestions,
the World Bank could become a visible player in the area of human rights,
a role which the Bank is not only well-qualified to play, but more
significantly, a role which the Bank has an obligation to play. At present,
the World Bank is considered a failure when it comes to effectively
advocating for human rights. In addition, more and more people are
becoming enlightened as to the Bank's persistent practice of providing
loans and economic assistance to countries notorious for gross and
systematic human rights violations. With this in mind, it would not be
unusual for citizens to interpret the Bank's actions as an implied blessing
and an outright encouragement of human rights violations in those
countries, a perception which the Bank, itself, would undoubtedly argue.
Becoming a well-established human rights advocate would not only
eliminate the possibility of such interpretation, but also has the potential of
saving many lives and stopping many forms of human misery around the
globe.
Finally, by becoming a human rights advocate, the World Bank
will be able to refine and soften its rigid image in the eyes of the
international community, an image that was expressed by the former Bank
director, A. W. Clausen, when he said that "[tihe World Bank is not the
Robin Hood of the international financial sector, nor the United Way of the
development community. The World Bank is a hardheaded, unsentimental
institution that takes a very pragmatic and nonpolitical view of what it is
trying to do."°0
The World Bank has the promise of becoming the most dynamic
human rights enforcer ever, a role that will undoubtedly benefit the Bank
itself. Yet whether the Bank can effectively utilize such potential is a
question only the World Bank can answer, and so far the World Bank has
not responded.
106. Hutchins, supra note 60, at 514 (quoting ALDEN W. CLAUSEN, BANKING ON THE
POOR 236 (1983)).
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